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Last term, in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Com-
mittee v. Federal Election Commission,t the Supreme Court con-
sidered a direct attack on the constitutionality of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act's ("FECA") limits on political party ex-
penditures. Colorado Republican was the Court's first campaign 
finance case in six years and the first in which the four Justices 
appointed by Presidents Bush and Clinton had an opportunity to 
participate. Colorado Republican was also the first case in the 
twenty-year regime of Buckley v. Valeoz concerned with the con-
stitutionality of restrictions on parties.3 Coming at a time of ris-
ing public concern, increased legislative activity, and continued 
academic ferment over campaign finance, Colorado Republican 
offered the promise of clarifying the current Court's approach to 
campaign finance regulation, marking out the contours of the 
* Professor of Law and Director of Legislative Drafting Research Fund, Columbia 
University. This Comment is based on a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, September 1, 1996. 
1. 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996). 
2. 424 u.s. 1 (1976). 
3. Buckley addressed only one issue concerning parties-the claim that FECA dis-
criminated, in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, against independ-
ent candidates and parties without national committees because the Act authorized 
additional spending for political party national committees. The Court determined that, as 
a portion of the Buckley decision invalidated the limits on aggregate campaign expendi-
tures and independent expenditures, it had eliminated the basis for the discrimination 
claim. 424 U.S. at 58-59 and nn.66, 67. The Court did not consider any First Amendment 
challenge to limits on party spending. 
In Federal Elections Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 
U.S. 27, 28-29 (1981), the Court considered the statutory question of whether FECA 
barred an "agency agreement," that is, a state party's designation of a national party 
committee as the state party's agent for making expenditures allowed by the Act. In 
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1982), the Court 
considered the constitutionality of the application of disclosure requirements to a minor 
party that had been subject to government harassment. 
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rights of parties in the campaign finance context, and assessing 
the implications of judicial doctrine for potential legislative 
changes. 
The Court, however, failed to resolve the central issue in the 
case. Instead, it fragmented into four opinions, none of which 
commanded the votes of more than three Justices.4 A seven-
member majority rejected the effort of the Federal Elections 
Commission ("FEC") to enforce FECA in the case before it, but 
the three Justices who joined the pivotal opinion authored by 
Justice Breyer limited their views-and, thus, the holding of the 
Court-to the facts of the case and declined to reach the broader 
issue of the constitutionality of limits on party involvement in 
campaign finance. The six Justices who did reach the issue were 
sharply divided. Moreover, one Justice directly, and two others 
implicitly, challenged Buckley v. Valeo's basic approach to cam-
paign finance regulation-although their different opinions em-
braced decidedly different perspectives. 
Colorado Republican illustrates nicely the conceptual diffi-
culties built into the Court's campaign finance doctrine. Buck-
ley's central concerns have proven difficult to apply in practice or 
justify in theory, and the Court has vacillated with respect to the 
degree of deference to be given to the judgment of the political 
branches concerning whether campaign practices present dangers 
that may be the basis for regulation. 
Moreover, political party spending is particularly difficult to 
fit into the Court's conceptual framework because party activities 
bridge Buckley's basic doctrinal categories. Many academics 
have urged a more party-centered approach to campaign fi-
nance-the Committee for Party Renewal filed an amicus brief 
in the case-claiming it would reduce the influence of special in-
terests on the political process. However, so long as parties them-
selves receive their funds from private individuals and 
organizations, it is questionable whether a party-centered system 
would do much to ameliorate special interest influence. More-
over, judicial establishment of an unlimited party spending right 
could have broader effects on the campaign finance laws. 
Part I of this comment briefly summarizes the facts, statu-
tory framework, and procedural history of Colorado Republican. 
Part II reviews the Buckley doctrine. Parts III and IV examine 
and appraise the Court's multiple opinions. Finally, Parts V and 
VI consider the implications of constitutional protection of party 
4. In a sense there were five opinions, since Justice Thomas's opinion was joined in 
part, but only in part, by two other Justices. 
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spending for the campaign finance laws, and the implications of 
Colorado Republican for the future of campaign finance 
doctrine. 
I. BACKGROUND: THE FACTS, THE STATUTE, AND 
THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Colorado Republican was ten years in the making. In Janu-
ary 1986, then-Representative Tim Wirth declared his candidacy 
for the Democratic nomination for the Senate seat being vacated 
by Gary Hart that falLs Shortly thereafter, Wirth began to run 
ads outlining his position on a number of issues. In April and 
May 1986, the Colorado Republican Party paid for three radio 
ads and two pamphlets criticizing Wirth's voting record, mention-
ing that he was running for the Senate, and charging Wirth with 
misrepresenting his record in his ads. The anti-Wirth radio ad 
which became the subject of the FEC's enforcement action 
against the Colorado Republican Party included the following 
statements: 
"I just saw some ads where Tim Wirth said he's for a 
strong defense and a balanced budget. But according to his 
record, Tim Wirth voted against every major new weapon sys-
tem in the last five years. And he voted against the balanced 
budget amendment." 
"Tim Wirth has a right to run for the Senate, but he 
doesn't have a right to change the facts."6 
The state party committee paid $15,000 to run the ad. At the time 
it was aired, three Republicans were seeking their party's nomi-
nation, although two withdrew before the Republican state con-
vention in June. Wirth and his Republican opponent, Rep. Ken 
Kramer, were not officially nominated until their party primaries 
in August. 
In June 1986, the Colorado Democratic Party filed a com-
plaint with the FEC alleging that the Republican anti-Wirth ex-
penditures violated the spending limits FECA imposes on party 
committees.7 In January 1989, the FEC determined there was 
5. Wirth won the election, served out his six-year term, and declined to seek an-
other term, all before the district court in this case reached a decision. The case then took 
three more years to wend its way to the Supreme Court. 
6. FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Camp. Comm., 59 F.3d 1015, 1018 n.l (lOth 
Cir. 1995). 
7. The Democrats also alleged that the Republicans violated FECA's reporting re-
quirements in listing the costs of the anti-Wirth program as operating expenses and not as 
expenditures with respect to an election for federal office. 
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probable cause to believe the Republicans had violated FECA 
and, when settlement negotiations failed, instituted a civil en-
forcement action. The Republicans responded by arguing that 
the expenditures in question were not subject to the FECA lim-
its, and that the FECA limits are unconstitutional. 
FECA provides two avenues for parties to spend money on 
behalf of candidates for federal office. First, parties, like all other 
political committees, may contribute up to $5000 to a candidate 
"with respect to any election for Federal office. "s Second, parties 
may make "coordinated expenditures" on behalf of their candi-
dates. FECA ordinarily treats expenditures made "in coopera-
tion, consultation, or concert, with" a candidate as contributions 
subject to contribution limits even if the "donor" did not actually 
give the money to a candidate.9 FECA, however, provides a spe-
cial exception for party committee spending "in connection with 
the general election campaign of candidates"Io for Congress. In 
a Senate election, a party committee may spend up to two cents 
times the voting age population of the state in which the race 
occurs, or $20,000 adjusted for inflation from a 1974 base, in co-
ordination with the party's Senate candidate's campaign.n 
On the other hand, the FEC has determined that parties 
may not make "independent expenditures," that is, expenditures 
not in "cooperation, consultation, or concert" with a candidate. 
FECA, as amended in 1974, had imposed dollar ceilings on in-
dependent expenditures by individuals and political committees, 
but the Supreme Court in Buckley held such limits unconstitu-
tional. The FEC subsequently deemed parties incapable of mak-
ing expenditures truly independent of their own candidates' 
campaigns,12 and adopted a regulation forbidding national and 
state party committees from making "independent expenditures 
in connection with the general election campaign[s]" for federal 
office.B 
At the time of the 1986 election, the limit on coordinated 
party spending for the Senate race in Colorado was $103,000, 
8. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (1994). 
9. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (1994). 
10. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(1) (1994). 
11. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3)(A) (1994). This limit also applies to House of Representa-
tives races in any state entitled to only one Representative. For other elections to the 
House, the ceiling is $10,000 adjusted for inflation from a 1974 base. 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441a(d)(3)(B) (1994). 
12. See FEC Adv. Op'n 1985-14, 2 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) '15819 at 
11,185 n.4 (5/30/85); FEC Adv. Op'n 1984-15, 1 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) 
'15766 at 11,070 n. 2 (5/31/84). 
13. 11 C.F.R. § 110.7(b)(4) (1996). 
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which would have been more than enough to cover the anti-
Wirth ad. However, the Colorado state party, like most state Re-
publican parties, had assigned to the National Republican Sena-
torial Committee ("NRSC") its coordinated spending authority. 
As a result, the anti-Wirth ad violated FECA-if the spending 
limit applied, and was constitutional. 
In the lower courts, much of the Colorado Republican litiga-
tion focused on the question of the applicability of the FECA 
limits to the anti-Wirth ad. FECA's coordinated spending ceiling 
and reporting requirements apply only to expenditures "in con-
nection with" a federal election. But the notion of spending "in 
connection with" an election campaign is inherently fuzzy and 
potentially sweeping. Communications concerning the perform-
ance of public officials or the wisdom of pending legislation can 
certainly affect the electoral fortunes of candidates, so campaign 
finance regulations could logically apply to a wide range of com-
munications concerning politics and government. Such a broad 
reading could chill free and unfettered discussion of public issues. 
The Supreme Court thus determined that the First Amendment 
requires statutes regulating spending "in connection with" elec-
tions to be read narrowly and limited to spending expressly advo-
cating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.14 
Although the Colorado Republicans' ad clearly identified 
Tim Wirth, it did not litera1ly urge Wirth's defeat or the election 
of a Republican. The district court concluded that the ad "[a]t 
best ... contains an indirect plea for action" which fell short of 
the "express advocacy" required to avoid infringing on constitu-
tionally protected discussion of public issues.Is The FECA limit 
thus did not apply to the anti-Wirth ad, and the court dismissed 
the FEC's suit. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The appellate 
court agreed with the district court that the anti-Wirth ad was not 
express advocacy "within the narrow definition" of prior 
Supreme Court cases.t6 But, after extended analysis,17 the court 
deferred to the FEC's determination that limits on coordinated 
14. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1976); FEC v. Massachusens Citi-
zens for Life ("MCFL"), 479 U.S. 238, 248-50. The discussion in Buckley concerned a 
provision of FECA that Buckley ultimately invalidated. MCFL considered the restriction 
on expenditures by corporations and unions. Neither case directly addressed the meaning 
of the "in connection with" language in the context of party coordinated spending. 
15. FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Camp. Comm., 839 F. Supp. 1448, 1455-56 (D. 
Colo. 1993). 
16. FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Camp. Comm., 59 F.3d 1015, 1023 n.lO (lOth 
Cir. 1995). 
17. Id. at 1019-23. 
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party spending could be constitutionally applied to spending with 
an "electioneering message" concerning a clearly identified can-
didate. Ihe court found that the Republican ad did have an elec-
tioneering message with respect to Wirth and, thus, that the 
FECA limit applied. Since the state Republicans had transferred 
their statutory spending authority to the NRSC, their expendi-
tures violated the FECA ceiling on coordinated party spending. 
The court then briefly considered and rejected the Republican 
claim that the FECA limit was unconstitutional. 
II. THE BUCKLEY DOCTRINE AND PARTY SPENDING 
A. BASIC ELEMENTS OF BUCKLEY 
In both the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court, the analy-
sis of the constitutionality of the FECA spending limits was 
framed by Buckley v. Valeo. Although "one of the most vilified 
Supreme Court decisions of the post-World War II era,"1s Buck-
ley has for two decades dominated judicial review of campaign 
finance regulations. 
Buckley has three major elements. First, the Court deter-
mined that campaign finance regulations impinge on the core 
First Amendment concerns of political expression and associa-
tion. Without quite concluding that "money is speech," the Court 
found that money is essential for the dissemination of political 
messages and that contributing money "enables like-minded per-
sons to pool their resources in furtherance of common political 
goals."I9 As a result, government regulation of campaign fi-
nances would be subject to "the exacting scrutiny required by the 
First Amendment."zo 
Second, and more controversially, the Court determined 
that the sole justification for limiting political spending is the pre-
vention of corruption and the appearance of corruption. The 
Court rejected the argument that restrictions could be used to 
promote equality of political influence among individuals or 
groups or to equalize candidates' resources.21 As the Court "fa-
mously or notoriously"zz asserted: "the concept that government 
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order 
18. Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1390, 1394 (1994). 
19. 424 U.S. at 22. See also id. at 65-66. 
20. ld. at 16. 
21. Id. at 48-49, 56-57. The Court also rejected the argument that the government 
could restrict spending in order to limit the cost of political campaigns. Id. at 57. 
22. David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 
Colum. L. Rev. 1369, 1369 (1994). 
1997] CAMPAIGN FINANCE 97 
to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the 
First Amendment."z3 
Third, the Court drew an operational distinction between 
expenditures-that is, spending by candidates, organizations and 
individuals on direct communications with voters-and contribu-
tions-that is, payments by an individual or group to a candidate, 
which the candidate uses to fund political communication with 
the voters. Expenditures were held to be core political speech 
and not to raise a danger of the corruption of candidates. As a 
result, Buckley invalidated FECA's restrictions on expenditures 
by candidates and independent committees. 
Contributions, by contrast, were given less protection. Un-
like an expenditure, a contribution does not entail an expression 
of political views: "A contribution serves as a general expression 
of support for the candidate and his views, but does not commu-
nicate the underlying basis for the support." The expressive com-
ponent of a contribution "rests solely on the undifferentiated, 
symbolic act of contributing." In contrast, the size of the contri-
bution "does not increase perceptibly" the quantity of the con-
tributor's communication. "While contributions may result in 
political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to 
present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions 
into political debate involves speech by someone other than the 
contributor."z4 
Moreover, contributions do raise the spectre of corruption: 
"To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a 
political quid pro quo from current and potential officeholders, 
the integrity of our system of representative government is un-
dermined."zs Congress-and state and local governments regu-
lating campaigns for state and local offices-could thus impose 
dollar limits on the size of contributions. 
B. PROBLEMS WITH APPLYING BUCKLEY 
Although the Buckley framework appears straightforward, 
the Court has had great difficulty with campaign finance cases.z6 
23. 424 U.S. at 48-49. 
24. Id. at 21. 
25. ld. at 26-27. 
26. The Buckley decision commanded a 6-2 majority, although three members of the 
court dissented from portions of the per curiam opinion. The next major campaign fi-
nance case, First Nat'/ Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) drew four dissents. 
The critical opinion in California Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) was joined only 
by a plurality. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) drew 
one dissent and three concurring Justices who endorsed a narrower rationale than Chief 
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The Court has run into three problems: (i) applying the contribu-
tion/expenditure distinction; (ii) determining the meaning of cor-
ruption; and (iii) deciding the degree of deference to be accorded 
to Congress or state and local elected officials-and the extent of 
consideration given to empirical evidence presented by litigants 
defending campaign finance restrictions-in determining 
whether the kinds of dangers which the Court has indicated may 
be the basis of regulation actually exist in a particular case. 
(1) Drawing the Contribution/Expenditure Line: The contri-
bution/expenditure distinction so central to the analysis in Buck-
ley and later cases has proven difficult to apply. Some campaign 
practices-a candidate's donation of personal funds to her own 
campaign, or expenditures by groups not connected with a candi-
date expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly iden-
tified candidate-are arguably both contributions and 
expenditures. The candidate's donation to her own campaign is 
in form a contribution, yet it funds the candidate's own speech so 
it resembles an expenditure.27 Independent expenditures are for-
mally expenditures but raise the possibility that a candidate who 
benefits from an independent committee's support will feel an 
obligation to the spender comparable to that created by a 
contribution.zs 
Other practices-such as a contribution to a political organi-
zation or intermediary for election-related purposes-are argua-
bly neither contributions nor expenditures within the Buckley 
analysis. A contribution to an intermediary is plainly not an ex-
penditure, but, given the lack of a direct tie between donor and 
candidate, it may not present the vice Buckley found in 
contributions.z9 
Justice Burger's opinion for the Court. FEC v. National Conservative Political Action 
Committee, 470 U.S. 480 (1984) drew two dissents. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 
479 U.S. 238 (1986) and Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 
(1990) were marked by 5-4 and 6-3 splits and multiple opinions. Of the major constitu-
tional cases, only FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982) pro-
duced a unanimous Court. 
27. Buckley treated a candidate's contribution of personal funds to her own cam-
paign as an expenditure for First Amendment purposes. 424 U.S. at 51-54. Justice Mar-
shall, who joined all other aspects of Buckley, dissented from this point. Id. at 286-87. 
28. The Court has held that independent expenditures undertaken without "prear-
rangement and coordination" with a candidate are to be treated as expenditures for First 
Amendment purposes. Id. at 39-51. Accord, National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 497-
501. But see id. at 502, 510-11 (White, J., dissenting); 518-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
But cf. Austin, 494 U.S. at 668-69 (upholding prohibition on spending by corporations). 
29. See, e.g., California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981); Citizens Against 
Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); FEC v. Nat'/ Right to Work Commit-
tee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982). 
1997] CAMPAIGN FINANCE 99 
And proposals to impose limits on the total amount of con-
tributions candidates can receive from particular categories of 
donors, such as political action committees,3o or to impose very 
low contribution limits,31 point up the constitutionally trouble-
some fact that all expenditures, except those funded by a candi-
date's personal wealth, ultimately derive from contributions. 
The difficulty of applying the contribution/expenditure dis-
tinction is closely connected to the distinction's shaky justifica-
tion. It might be easier to draw the line if the Court had been 
more persuasive in explaining why the line ought to be drawn. 
The Court's effort to establish that contributions are a lower or-
der of speech than expenditures (assuming that both are consti-
tutionally protected speech) seems increasingly tenuous. For 
candidates, in the absence of public funding, contribution limits 
necessarily curtail the expenditures of all but the wealthiest, self-
funding candidates, or force them to shift their activities from 
actually communicating with voters to prospecting among donors 
for funds,32 thus reducing the amount of public political speech. 
For donors, a contribution is a device for pooling individual 
views and enabling them to be amplified by a candidate-who 
can be a "great communicator"-thus providing more effective 
dissemination of those views than if the donor had spent an iden-
tical sum on expenditures to speak to the voters directly. 
Contribution limits are particularly problematic from the 
perspective of freedom of association. Contributions may be only 
indirect speech-"speech by proxy"33-but they are a direct 
form of association. If speech is infringed by spending limits, then 
freedom of association ought to be comparably infringed by con-
tribution ceilings that limit the amount of support an individual 
can give to a campaign. Indeed, in cases since Buckley the Court 
has given greater weight to freedom of association in reviewing 
campaign regulations.34 Increasingly, the justification for the con-
30. Cf. Gard v. Wisconsin State Elec. Bd., 456 N.W.2d 809, 812,829 (Wis.), cert. den. 
498 U.S. 982 (1990) (sustaining absolute dollar cap on funding a candidate may receive 
from all committees, including PACs and party committees). 
31. See, e.g., Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995) (invalidating low contribu-
tion limit); National Black Police Ass'n v. D.C. Bd. of Elec. and Ethics, 924 F. Supp. 270 
(D.D.C. 1996) (same). 
32. For a forceful argument concerning the constitutional significance of the diver-
sion of officeholders' time to fundraising, see Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening 
Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amend-
ment After All, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1281 (1994). 
33. Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
34. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 295-99; FEC v. Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 251-56 (plurality opinion); id. at 265-66 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). 
100 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 14:91 
tribution limits, and for the contribution/expenditure distinction, 
appears to rely less on the lower status of contributions than on 
the greater dangers contributions are said to pose for the political 
process. 
(2) The Meaning of Corruption: Preventing corruption and 
the appearance of corruption "are the only legitimate and com-
pelling government interests thus far identified for restricting 
campaign finances."35 The Court, however, has never actually de-
fined what it means by "corruption or the appearance of corrup-
tion." "Corruption" is sometimes equated with "improper 
influence" or "undue influence" over officeholders-without 
analysis of the distinction between proper and improper influ-
ences. Typically, the Court has given the notion of corruption a 
narrow reading, akin to bribery. As then-Justice Rehnquist as-
serted in FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Commit-
tee ("NCPAC"), "(t]he hallmark of corruption is the financial 
quid pro quo: dollars for political favors."36 In this vision, the 
corruption concern is triggered only by the exchange of favors or 
the possibility of (and the appearance of the possibility of) the 
exchange of favors between donors and elected officials. 
If corruption means exchange of favors, then the contribu-
tion/expenditure distinction may be sound in principle-contri-
butions raise the possibility of the exchange of favors, whereas 
direct communications to the voters by candidates or interest 
groups do not involve such exchanges. But gross inequalities in 
spending by candidates, interest groups, or other political organi-
zations that do not involve quid pro quos are not considered cor-
rupting and thus cannot be barred by restrictions on spending. 
With corruption as quid pro quo, moreover, some hard cases, 
such as the issue of a candidate's use of personal wealth, become 
easy since the candidate cannot corrupt herself. 
On other occasions, however, the Court has suggested that 
"corruption" may be read more broadly to include the spending 
of large sums of money that have an "undue influence on the 
outcome" of an election and thereby undermine "the confidence 
of the people in the democratic process and the integrity of gov-
emment."37 If corruption includes the influence that large sums 
of money can have on the outcome of an election-whether be-
35. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 496-97. 
36. Id. at 497. 
37. See First Nat'/ Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978). See also 
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 301 (1981) (Marshall, J., 
concurring); id at 302-03 (Blackmun, J., and O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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cause such influence is itself corrupting3s or because it jeopar-
dizes "voter confidence in government"39-then expenditures 
can be as corrupting as contributions and expenditures could be 
limited in the name of preventing corruption and the appearance 
of corruption. 
Prior to 1990 the Court had never found evidence that the 
potential to engage in unlimited spending posed a threat to voter 
confidence in government adequate to justify a spending restric-
tion, but in that year Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce4o 
upheld a state law restricting corporate political expenditures by 
finding that the state could justify the law as necessary to control 
"the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of 
wealth" which could "unfairly influence elections when . . . 
deployed in the form of independent expenditures."41 If undue 
influence on the electoral process-and not just undue influence 
over elected officials, which is the sole focus of the quid pro quo 
model-could become a basis for campaign finance restrictions, 
then both the practical ability and the normative rationale for 
distinguishing between contributions and expenditures for First 
Amendment purposes would be substantially eroded. 
To be sure, central to Austin and other cases dealing with 
limits on corporate political activity was the Court's assertion 
that corporations pose a unique danger of corruption. Corpora-
tions enjoy a "unique state-conferred corporate structure"42 that 
enables them to accumulate large sums of money. These financial 
resources reflect the success of the corporation's commercial ac-
tivities and not the extent of support for its political ideas. Limits 
on corporations are justifiable "to ensure that substantial aggre-
gations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go 
with the corporate form of organization ... [are] not converted 
into political 'war chests'."43 
Austin's attempt to limit its concern with large campaign war 
chests to corporations is unpersuasive. In First National Bank of 
38. Cf. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990) (re-
ferring to the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth" and 
asserting that "[c]orporate wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in 
the form of independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise of political 
contributions"). 
39. Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 302 (Blackmun, J., and O'Connor, J., 
concurring). 
40. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
41. Id. at 660. 
42. Id. at 659-60. 
43. FEC v. Nat'/ Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982). 
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Boston v. Bellotti,44 its first case dealing with corporate political 
spending, the Court emphasized that the touchstone for analysis 
was "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity 
for informing the public ... not ... the identity of its source, 
whether corporation, association, union, or individual."4s The 
corporate status of the speaker, then, ought to be irrelevant to an 
assessment of the basis for regulating the speech. It is hard to see 
why state-granted advantages make corporate speech more cor-
rupting. Moreover, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his Austin dis-
sent, corporations are not alone in receiving special advantages 
from the state.46 Nor are corporations unique in their capacity to 
divert wealth obtained in the economic marketplace to political 
purposes. Other business associations-as well as billionaire indi-
viduals who benefit from inheritance laws or obtain their wealth 
from investments in corporations-may build up campaign war 
chests "that have little or no correlation to the public's support 
for the[ir] ... political ideas."47 
Nonetheless, whatever the logical difficulties of limiting Aus-
tin's more expansive notion of "corruption" to corporations, that 
is what the Court asserted it did. As a result, "quid pro quo" 
remains the dominant model of "corruption," and the "undue in-
fluence over electoral outcomes" definition of corruption has 
been limited to cases involving corporations. Still, Austin-the 
last campaign finance case prior to Colorado Republican-
opened up the possibility of a broader meaning of corruption, 
including a concern with the kinds of inequalities Buckley dis-
missed. And, as Archibald Cox observed, "[o]nce loosed, the 
idea of Equality is not easily cabined."48 
(3) Degree of Deference to Elected Decisionmakers: The con-
stitutionality of the regulation of independent expenditures is an 
empirical question as well as a normative one. Even if the mean-
44. 435 u.s. 765 (1978) 
45. Id. at 777. Bellotti differed from Austin in one important respect. Bellotti in-
volved corporate spending in a referendum election, whereas Austin addressed independ-
ent corporate spending in a candidate election. That difference would have significance if 
"corruption" were limited to the danger of quid pro quos, since the Court has determined 
that referenda and other ballot questions do not present the danger of an exchange of 
favors between special interests and officeholders. Id. at 790. However, Austin's expan-
sion of "corruption" to include "undue influence" over election outcomes eliminates the 
significance of that difference. If Austin really is a "corporations" case, it is in direct ten-
sion with Bellotti. 
46. Austin, 494 U.S. at 680. 
47. Id. at 652. See Ashdown, Controlling Campaign Spending and the 'New Corrup-
tion': Waiting for the Court, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 767, 783-84 (1991). 
48. Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of 
Human Rights, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 91 (1966). 
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ing of corruption were clear, and even if it were limited to the 
quid pro quo model, it would still be debatable whether the dan-
ger of corruption is present in a particular setting. 
Thus, a legislature might conclude that expenditures by in-
dependent committees supporting or opposing particular candi-
dates might raise the prospect of quid pro quo corruption. 
Similarly, even if an individual's contribution to a political action 
committee or other political organization raises no question of 
the individual corrupting the organization, a legislature might 
conclude that there was sufficient danger that donors might use 
such intermediaries as conduits for the exchange of favors with 
the candidates who receive contributions from the intermediary, 
so that contributions by individuals to political organizations that 
do not run candidates for office ought to be regulated. In addi-
tion, a legislature has to make the very basic decision of how 
large (or, perhaps, how small) a contribution raises the danger of 
corruption. 
The Court thus has to decide how much deference to give to 
the elected decisionmakers in determining whether a particular 
campaign practice presents a danger of corruption. But the 
Court's standard of deference has ranged widely. In Buckley the 
Court deferred to Congress concerning the level of limits on indi-
vidual donations to candidates, and the overall limit on individ-
ual contributions to political committees in a calendar year. 
Sustaining FECA's low reporting and recordkeeping thresholds, 
Buckley stated "we cannot require Congress to establish that it 
has chosen the highest reasonable threshold." That "line" was 
"best left ... to congressional discretion" and was upheld be-
cause it was not "wholly without rationality"49-a remarkably re-
laxed standard given the Court's finding that the reporting and 
disclosure rules implicate fundamental rights and are subject to 
"exacting scrutiny."so Similarly, the Court has also deferred to a 
Congressional judgment that contributions to intermediary orga-
nizations could be regulated because of the danger that those or-
ganizations might serve as conduits linking their donors to 
candidates.s1 
On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly rejected Con-
gressional judgments that expenditures by independent commit-
tees raise dangers of corruption. Relying on its own armchair 
empiricism, Buckley found that because of the "absence of prear-
49. 424 U.S. at 83. 
50. Id. at 64. 
51. California Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 197-98, 201 (1981). 
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rangement and coordination," such expenditures "may well pro-
vide little assistance" to a candidate's campaign and, thus, 
alleviate the danger of a quid pro quo. A decade later NCPAC 
reaffirmed this position, notwithstanding evidence that independ-
ent committees had played an important role in the 1980 presi-
dential race, largely in support of Ronald Reagan. 
Critics of independent spending had urged that candidates 
and independent committees had found ways to use the in-
dependent committees to bolster candidates even in the absence 
of formal "prearrangement and coordination," and that or-
ganizers of the pro-Reagan independent committees had re-
ceived appointments in the Reagan Administration.sz But 
NCPAC found that on the record before it "an exchange of polit-
ical favors for uncoordinated expenditures remains a hypotheti-
cal possibility and nothing more,"s3 even though the trial court 
excluded most of the evidence of corruption proferred by the 
FEC-a decision which the Supreme Court sustained.s4 Thus, a 
strong evidentiary burden is placed on those who would regulate 
independent expenditures-with the Court unwilling to look at 
much of the evidence. 
In the corporations cases the Court's vacillation has been 
acute. In different cases, it has dismissed out of hand the argu-
ment that corporations present any danger of undue inftuence;ss 
deferred to a Congressional or state legislative judgment that 
corporations in general present unique dangers, without requir-
ing that regulation be limited to corporations that actually amass 
the wealth necessary to fund a war chest that poses a danger of 
undue inftuence;s6 and upheld regulation in principle but re-
quired Congress to target only those corporations whose war 
chests are divorced from political supports? 
Outside the corporate context, the Court's rule appears to 
be: As contributions in general raise the danger of corruption, 
Congress may regulate them without showing that a particular 
type of contribution raises any danger, but as expenditures in 
general raise little danger of corruption, Congress must meet an 
exacting burden of demonstrating that a particular expenditure 
raises the danger of corruption. The stringency of review thus 
52. See, e.g., Elizabeth Drew, Politics and Money 136-41 (Macmillan, 1983); Herbert 
E. Alexander, Financing the 1980 Election 142 (Lexington Books, 1983). 
53. 470 U.S. at 498. 
54. Id. at 499-500. 
55. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789. 
56. FEC v. Nat'/ Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982). 
57. See, e.g., FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, lnc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
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seems to turn on the Court's own antecedent judgment of the 
relative degree of danger a practice presents, even though legisla-
tive findings or empirical evidence are supposed to be the basis 
of the Court's determination of whether a danger justifying regu-
lation is present. 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR FECA LIMITS ON pARTY SPENDING 
The FECA limit on party spending potentially raises-and 
intertwines-all three questions that have plagued the applica-
tion of Buckley. Party spending blurs the expenditure/contribu-
tion distinction. It is formally an expenditure, but given the close 
ties between parties and their candidates, party spending could 
plausibly be treated as a contribution. FECA and the FEC treat 
party spending like contributions and impose dollar limits. 
Should the judgment of the political branches receive deference, 
or should the Court engage in its own non-deferential assessment 
of the dangers posed by party spending? 
Does party committee spending pose a danger of the corrup-
tion of candidates? Does the close relationship between a party 
and its candidate that makes the contribution/expenditure dis-
tinction so difficult to apply undermine the concern with party 
corruption of a candidate-or does it just make the concern 
stronger? What would corruption mean in this context? Can 
party committee spending be regulated because of the danger 
that the party will be a conduit for interest group or wealthy indi-
vidual donations? Can party spending committees be regulated 
to prevent one party from having an undue influence over the 
election? What weight should be given to the judgment of Con-
gress or the FEC that party spending presents some danger of 
corruption? 
The Colorado Republican Court failed to reach a consensus 
on any of these issues, leaving the extent of deference to Con-
gress, the categorization of party-spending within the Buckley 
framework, the meaning of corruption in the party-candidate 
context, and the constitutionality of the regulation of party 
spending outside the particular facts of the anti-Wirth ad, 
unresolved. 
III. THE FRAGMENTED COLORADO 
REPUBLICAN COURT 
Colorado Republican produced four opinions, none of which 
garnered the support of more than three Justices. Four Justices, 
in two opinions joined by three Justices apiece-with two Justices 
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joining both opinions-were willing to strike down FECA's lim-
its on party spending coordinated with candidates. Two Justices 
voted to validate FECA's limits and to enforce the FEC's suit 
against the Colorado Republican Party. Three Justices deter-
mined that the FECA restriction could not be constitutionally 
applied against the anti-Wirth ad campaign but declined to con-
sider the broader question of the constitutionality of limits on 
party spending. Moreover, none of the opinions considered the 
question that had divided the lower courts in this and other 
cases-whether FECA's limits can be applied to speech that falls 
short of express advocacy but contains an "electioneering 
message." 
A. THE PLURALITY OPINION 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, de-
termined that the FECA limit on coordinated expenditures could 
not be applied to the anti-Wirth ad because the Colorado Repub-
lican Party had not, in fact, coordinated the ads with any Repub-
lican candidate. The Colorado Republican spending was, thus, 
truly independent spending and, like the independent spending 
of "individuals, candidates and ordinary political committees" 
could not be subject to limitation.ss 
First, the plurality found that the anti-Wirth spending was 
not in fact coordinated with any Republican candidate. The ads 
were aired at a time when there were three Republicans contend-
ing for the Senate nomination so there was no general election 
candidate. Moreover, the impetus for the ad had come from the 
state party chairman, who had "arranged for the development of 
the script at his own initiative." Work on the script was limited to 
state party staff; the senate contenders and their staffs were not 
involved.s9 
Second, the plurality rejected the FEC's argument that party 
committees are incapable of making expenditures independent 
of their party's candidates, since the FEC failed to provide any 
empirical support, either in its advisory opinions or in its argu-
ments before the Court, for this assertion.60 Moreover, the stat-
ute itself did not clearly preclude a finding that some party 
spending could be independent. 
58. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2317 
(19%). 
59. ld. at 2315. 
60. Id. at 2318. 
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Finally, Justice Breyer concluded that the government 
presented no evidence that independent spending by parties 
presents any greater dangers of corruption than the independent 
spending of other political committees or individuals. Once 
again, "the absence of prearrangement and coordination" was 
said to "alleviate" the danger of a quid pro quo.61 Comparing 
independent spending by party committees and individuals, "the 
constitutionally significant fact, present equally in both instances, 
is the lack of coordination between the candidate and the source 
of the expenditure."62 
Having determined that FECA's limits on coordinated ex-
penditures could not constitutionally be applied to an expendi-
ture that was independent-in-fact, the plurality declined to reach 
the general question of the constitutionality of FECA's limits on 
party spending. Indeed, the plurality avoided any statement that 
parties enjoy a constitutionally preferred position with respect to 
campaign finance. The plurality rejected the argument, embraced 
by one of the concurrences, that "a party and its candidate are 
identical,"63 and, in stressing the significance of the indepen-
dence of the anti-Wirth spending in avoiding the danger of cor-
ruption, it implicitly rejected the contention of the other 
concurrence that parties are incapable of corrupting their candi-
dates.64 Indeed, the plurality commented that parties "share rele-
vant features with many PACs."6s 
The Breyer opinion managed to block the application of the 
FECA limit to the anti-Wirth ad while doing minimal damage to 
the overall structure of FECA and avoiding the tensions in the 
Buckley framework. The plurality minimized the significance of 
its lack of deference to the political branches by noting that the 
FEC had failed to do the homework necessary to prove that "in-
dependent" party spending is impossible in fact, and that Con-
gress's authorization of party coordinated expenditures up to a 
statutory ceiling did not preclude a finding that some party ex-
penditures could be truly independent. 
Thus, although the idea of "independent" party spending 
creates a hole in FECA it appears to reflect the plurality's effort 
to adhere to Buckley's contribution/expenditure distinction. 
Party committees were presumed to be like other political com-
mittees-some party spending might be coordinated with candi-
61. Id. at 2316. 
62. Id. at 2317. 
63. Id. at 2319. 
64. Id. at 2316. 
65. ld. at 2320. 
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dates and some might be independent. Indeed, noting that 
coordinated party expenditures "share some of the constitution-
ally relevant features" of both expenditures and contributions, 
the plurality gave the very inability of party spending to fit neatly 
into Buckley's conceptual boxes as a reason for not addressing 
the Republicans' broader challenge to the constitutionality of the 
limits on party spending.66 
B. THE CONCURRING OPINIONS 
Four Justices in two overlapping groups of three concurred 
in the judgment but dissented from the plurality's reasoning: they 
would have completely invalidated FECA's ceiling on coordi-
nated party spending. Justice Kennedy's opinion rejected the 
idea of party independence from candidates, but concluded that, 
whether or not coordinated with their candidates, party spending 
ought to be treated as constitutionally protected expenditures. 
Justice Thomas's opinion urged that since party spending 
presents only a minimal danger of corruption there is no consti-
tutional basis for its limitation. 
Justice Kennedy's opinion explicitly rejected the plurality's 
emphasis on the independence of the Colorado Republicans' 
spending. Instead, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Scalia, Justice Kennedy stressed the "practical identity of inter-
ests between the two entities [parties and their candidates] dur-
ing an election" and the "tradition of political parties and their 
candidates engaging in joint First Amendment activity."67 Rather 
than look to independence-in-fact of a particular expenditure, he 
concluded that a party's "fate in an election is inextricably inter-
twined with that of its candidates."68 
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that party spending would 
generally function as a contribution to a candidate, but found 
that such spending also represents the party's speech on its own 
behalf since "in the context of particular elections, candidates are 
necessary to make the party's message known and effective, and 
vice versa."69 As the political speech of a political association, 
party spending, even spending coordinated with the candidate a 
party supports, could not constitutionally be limited. 
Justice Thomas's opinion, also joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice Scalia, took a slightly different tack. Justice 
66. ld. 
67. I d. at 2323. 
68. ld. 
69. Id. at 2322. 
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Thomas ridiculed the assertion that there was any danger of cor-
ruption in a party supporting its own candidate. Justice Thomas 
considered two possible sources of corruption: the influence of 
the party itself on the candidate, and the influence of a party's 
donors. Justice Thomas denied that party influence per se could 
ever be considered corruptive. "The very aim of a political party 
is to influence its candidate's stance on issues." If a party suc-
ceeds "that is not corruption; that is successful advocacy of ideas 
in the political marketplace and representative government in a 
party system. "7o 
As for any danger that coordinated party spending might 
provide an opportunity for donors to the party to exert undue 
influence over the party's nominee, Justice Thomas noted that 
the "numerous members with a wide variety of interests" found 
in parties makes it unlikely that any one person or interest group 
could use a party to exact a quid pro quo from a candidate. The 
influence of particular interests would be "significantly diffused" 
by other interests. Further, there is "little risk" that a party could 
be used by wealthy donors as a conduit for corrupting candidates 
so long as the Court "continues to permit Congress to subject 
individuals to limits on the amount they can give to parties"7t-
although in another part of his opinion, not joined by any other 
Justice, Justice Thomas urged that contribution caps be held 
unconstitutional.72 
c. THE DISSENT 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented in a 
brief opinion.73 The dissent agreed with Justice Kennedy that a 
party and its candidate have "a unique relationship" which pre-
cludes Justice Breyer's finding of independence. The dissenting 
Justices, however, concluded that Congress could constitutionally 
limit party spending. 
Disagreeing with Justice Thomas, Justice Stevens found that 
party coordinated spending could be corrupting-or, rather, that 
Congress could find it so-first, because it could give a party, "or 
the persons who control the party" influence "over the candidate 
by virtue of its power to spend," and, second, because of the dan-
ger of conduit corruption.74 
70. ld. at 2331. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 2329. 
73. Id. at 2332. 
74. ld. 
110 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 14:91 
In addition, Justice Stevens asserted that limits on party 
spending were justified by the government's "important interest 
in levelling the electoral playing field by constraining the cost of 
federal campaigns."7s 
IV. ANALYSIS: PLACING PARTIES IN THE 
BUCKLEY FRAMEWORK 
A. INDEPENDENCE-IN-FACT? 
Despite its clever use of the idea of independence-in-fact to 
avoid addressing the constitutional challenge raised by the Colo-
rado Republican Party, the plurality opinion causes considerable 
problems on its own. First, it is highly fact-dependent, without 
making clear exactly the facts on which it depends. The anti-
Wirth ad campaign occurred before the party had nominated a 
candidate, indeed, while the nomination was still contested by 
several candidates. Is that essential, or can a party engage in in-
dependent spending on behalf of the likely nominee-including 
an incumbent-or even for the actual nominee, provided that 
formal contact between the candidate and the party committee is 
avoided? 
And exactly what formal contact has to be avoided? Justice 
Breyer's opinion emphasized the lack of coordination with re-
spect to the advertising campaign itself.76 Can a party committee 
that provides a candidate with computer services, polling data, 
assistance in training staff, fundraising and even funds, 77 engage 
in an "independent" media campaign on the candidate's behalf if 
it avoids direct contact with the candidate and the candidate's 
committee with respect to advertising strategy? 
Second, to the extent that party committees take care to 
minimize their actual cooperation with candidates, the plurality 
opinion could have the potentially perverse consequence-per-
verse, that is, from the perspective of those who have called for a 
more party-centered campaign finance system as a way of pro-
moting party accountability in government-of driving parties 
away from their candidates. The modern trend in Congressional 
campaigns has been for party committees, especially the Republi-
can and Democratic campaign committees, to take a greater role 
75. ld. 
76. Id. at 2315. 
77. For a description of the kinds of services party committees now provide their 
candidates, see Larry J. Sabato, The Party's Just Begun: Shaping Political Parties for 
America's Future 75-81 (Scott, Foresman, 1988); PaulS. Hermson, Party Campaigning in 
the 1980s 47-83 (Harvard U. Press, 1988). 
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in recrmtmg candidates, assisting candidates with their cam-
paigns, and, especially, helping candidates with communications, 
including the development of issue positions and the actual pro-
duction of advertising.7s One result has been a "greater nationali-
zation of campaign themes,"79 which may be a step toward 
greater party cohesion with respect to major issues. 
The plurality's approach could force parties to choose be-
tween providing financial support to their candidates and work-
ing with those candidates on their campaign agendas. Thus, 
greater independent party spending might actually reinforce, 
rather than undermine, the candidate-centered campaigns that 
party government advocates have criticized. 
Third, Colorado Republican will make it difficult for the 
FEC to enforce the ceiling on coordinated expenditures that the 
plurality was careful to avoid upsetting. As journalists and schol-
ars who have examined "independent" spending by non-party 
political committees have observed, "[t]here are all manners of 
ways in which people running 'independent' campaigns can run 
them in tandem with the candidates" without formal consulta-
tion.so The prospects for tacit cooperation are far greater in the 
candidate-party context given the likelihood of ongoing ties be-
tween parties and their candidates, the involvement of many can-
didates in their parties, and the stakes parties have in the success 
of their candidates. The FEC, which has never been known for its 
timely or vigorous enforcement of the campaign finance laws,s1 is 
poorly situated to police the relationships between candidates 
and committees, or to carry the heavy burden of proving that 
independence-in-fact has been compromised in a particular case. 
Although the FEC may have erred in concluding that inde-
pendence-in-fact is never possible, it seems likely that it is rela-
tively rare. The presumption of coordination may have been an 
administratively useful prophylactic rule for enforcing the statu-
tory ban on coordinated expenditures.sz By forcing the FEC to 
78. See, e.g., Hermson, Party Campaigning in the 1980s at 60-65 (cited in note 77). 
79. Id. at 64. 
80. See Drew, Politics and Money at 136-41 (cited in note 52); Alexander, Financing 
the 1980 Election at 142 (cited in note 52). 
81. At least part of the FEC's difficulties derive from the weak institutional struc-
ture imposed by Congress. See Brooks Jackson, Broken Promise: Why the Federal Elec-
tion Commission Failed (Priority Press, 1990). 
82. The plurality in Colorado Republican noted that "[t]he Commission has not 
claimed ... that, administratively speaking, it is more difficult to separate a political 
party's 'independent' from its 'coordinated' expenditures than, say, those of a PAC," 116 
S. Ct. at 2318, but as the Colorado Republican Party had not argued that its spending was 
"independent" and not "coordinated" spending, it is not clear why the FEC would have 
thought it necessary to defend its position that all party spending is coordinated spending. 
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make the case not simply that party spending occurred but that 
the party committee actually cooperated with a candidate, the 
plurality may have invalidated the FECA limit in practice even 
as it strained to avoid doing so in theory. 
Finally, the whole notion of party "independent" spending 
seems formalistic and naive. Seeing the trees but not the forest, 
the plurality's tight focus on the absence of party-candidate dis-
cussion of a particular ad misses the web of relationships that 
link parties to their candidates' campaigns. Parties back candi-
dates and provide them with financial and logistical support. 
Candidates run on party lines, belong to parties, are often active 
in party organizations, and are frequently identified in terms of 
their party affiliation. Party committees, in turn, define their mis-
sion as the election of candidates bearing the party label. The 
protection of independent spending enables groups or individu-
als with independent agendas-that is, concerns other than the 
outcome of elections-to communicate their views with respect 
to elections to the voters. But the principal agenda of a political 
party committee is the election of the party's candidates.s3 The 
Colorado Republican Party's ad campaign was intended to 
weaken Tim Wirth and to elect a Republican-any Republican 
who might be nominated-not to further nonpartisan ideological 
or economic goals. 
In finding that parties could engage in independent spend-
ing, Justice Breyer sought to assure parties parity with PACs, 
other political committees, and individuals. But given their ongo-
ing ties to candidates, and their focus on electing candidates, par-
ties are not quite comparable to these other participants in the 
political process. That does not mean that they should receive 
less constitutional protection or more protection; it means simply 
that the effort to treat parties just like these other political actors 
is unpersuasive. 
As the other Colorado Republican opinions demonstrate, 
however, it is not easy to determine exactly what rights parties 
ought to enjoy, or to situate that determination within the Buck-
ley doctrine. 
B. PARTY-CANDIDATE IDENTITY? 
Central to Justice Kennedy's opinion is the claim that parties 
have a distinctive relationship with candidates which provides 
83. See, e.g., Gerald M. Pomper, Passions and Interests: Political Pany Concepts of 
American Democracy 3-4 (U. Press of Kansas, 1992) ("Parties are unique in their nominal 
unity and electoral focus."). 
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parties with a constitutional right to engage in unlimited cam-
paign spending. Although the notion of a distinctive relationship 
seems right-and the failure to acknowledge that relationship is 
the Achilles' heel of the plurality opinion-it is not obvious why 
the result is unlimited party spending. 
Initially, Justice Kennedy's opinion somewhat exaggerates 
the distinction between party committees and other political 
committees in terms of the relationship between committees and 
candidates. As the rise of "generic" party advertising indicates, 
parties are not entirely dependent on candidate campaigns to get 
their message across. Parties can and do spend money to voice 
party positions apart from urging the election or defeat of spe-
cific candidates. On the other hand, non-party committees might 
believe that the most effective way to get their message across is 
by supporting the campaign of a particular candidate. Certainly, 
if a candidate has embraced a controversial position on a particu-
lar issue-such as gun control, health care, or abortion-organi-
zations sharing that issue position might assert "a practical 
identity of interests" between themselves and the candidate dur-
ing the pendency of the campaign. 
The real difference between parties and other committees is 
the structural inability of parties to pursue their goals with re-
spect to candidate elections independently of their candidates' 
campaigns. Other political committees can mount independent 
campaigns. Given the web of ties between candidates and parties, 
it would be "impractical and imprudent," if not impossible, for 
parties to mount independent campaigns.B4 
But that does not mean that limits on coordinated spending 
"stifle" a party's voice. If, as Justice Kennedy contends, there is a 
"practical identity" between party and candidate, then presuma-
bly the party's message is being advanced by its nominee. As 
long as the party's candidate-its designated representative in 
the election-has a right of unlimited spending, then the FECA 
limits on coordinated spending cannot limit the communication 
of the party's message, since the candidate's spending will convey 
that message to the voters. 
Ironically, the real problem with the FECA limits may de-
rive not from party-candidate identity but from the existence of 
some differences between party and candidate interests. Party 
committees have such a major stake in the electoral success of 
their nominees that true independence is extremely unlikely, yet 
84. 116 S. Ct. at 2323. 
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party committees may also have their own distinctive interests-
such as the concern of party bureaucrats and professionals in 
maintaining the party as an organization-not represented by the 
candidate. Restrictions on party coordinated spending may limit 
the ability of party committees to advance those particular 
interests. 
The constitutionality of the FECA limits then turns on the 
central Buckley questions of whether coordinated party spending 
presents dangers of corruption or the appearance of corruption-
which also entails consideration of the degree of deference due 
to the political branches in making that judgment. Justice Ken-
nedy's opinion failed to address the question of corruption. 
Whether party spending can corrupt was, however, the focus of 
the Justice Thomas's concurrence and Justice Stevens's dissent. 
C. PARTY-CANDIDATE CORRUPTION? 
(1) Conduit Corruption:ss Justice Thomas appears to be on 
shaky ground in his quick dismissal of the dangers of conduit cor-
ruption. Clever party manipulation of the provision added to 
FECA in 1979 exempting money for state and local level volun-
teer activity and voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives 
from the Act's contribution and expenditure limitationss6-so-
called "soft money"-has eroded the significance of FECA's lim-
its on donations to party committees.87 Although the law permit-
ting soft money contributions restricts their use, the funds 
support party-building activities and free up federally regulated 
contributions for use in candidates' campaigns.ss Thus, both can-
didates and parties benefit from large soft money contributions. 
A relatively small number of "high rollers" play an impor-
tant role in party fund-raising. More than sixty contributors gave 
the Republican National Committee at least $100,000 apiece in 
85. After the submission of this Comment, a major campaign finance scandal involv-
ing the activities of the Democratic National Committee surfaced during the final weeks 
of the 1996 presidential campaign. This scandal confirms the significance of the conduit 
corruption concern raised in this section. Although the discussion in text gives more at-
tention to the activities of the Republican National Committee, the activities of DNC 
fundraisers in 1996 amply demonstrates that conduit corruption is a serious danger for 
both parties. Further analysis of the fundraising activities of the major parties in the 1996 
election is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
86. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(v), (x), (xi), (xii) (1994); 2 U.S.C.§ 431(9)(B)(iv), (viii), 
(ix) (1994). 
f57. The literature on "soft money" is legion. For a description of the history of soft 
money and its role in the 1992 election, see Herbert E. Alexander and Anthony Corrado, 
Financing the 1992 Election 147-75 (M.E. Sharpe, 1995). 
88. Brooks Jackson, Honest Graft: Big Money and the American Political Process 
146 (Knopf, 1988). 
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soft money in the 1991-92 campaign, while the Democrats re-
ceived gifts of more than $100,000 from seventy-two donors, in-
cluding nearly $400,000 from the steelworkers union and nearly 
$350,000 from the National Education Association.s9 Some inter-
ests loom large in the financing of particular parties. For exam-
ple, between January 1, 1995 and June 30, 1996-that is, well 
before the peak months of the 1996 presidential campaign-na-
tional Republican committees received $1.6 million from Philip 
Morris Co., $970,000 from RJR Nabisco, $448,000 from US To-
bacco, $400,000 from Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., and 
$300,000 from the Tobacco Institute.90 These are pretty large 
sums to be "diffused"-and there is at least anecdotal evidence 
of national Republican officials seeking to make state officehold-
ers more attentive to the tobacco industry's interests.9t More-
over, the parties have taken steps to promote direct contact, at 
meals, private meetings, and policy retreats, between their major 
financial backers and elected officeholders.92 
As the soft money gifts suggest, a broad-based party can 
serve as a conduit for more narrow interests. Like Justice 
Thomas, many advocates of a more party-centered campaign fi-
nance system have argued that an expanded party role would di-
lute the influence of big special interest donors.93 The growing 
role of special interest contributions in party finances, however, 
casts doubt on this sunny scenario. Removing limits on party 
spending without providing for public funding would almost cer-
tainly increase the parties' incentives to pursue large contribu-
tions, and concomitantly increase the prospects of special 
89. See Alexander and Corrado, Financing the 1992 Elections at 153-56 (cited in 
note 87). 
90. Top "Soft Money" Contributors to Republican Party Committees, Wash. Post, 
Aug. 14, 1996, at A19. 
91. See, e.g., Timothy Noah, GOP's Chief Pushed Pro-tobacco Bill at State Level, 
Arizona Lawmaker Says, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1996, at A20 (RNC National Chairman 
Haley Barbour phoned the Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives to pressure 
him into supporting a pro-tobacco bill); Tobacco Ties, Wall St. J., March 1, 1996, at AI 
(reporting that Haley Barbour called Texas Governor Bush's office to check on status of 
bill to restrict city anti-smoking ordinances). 
92. See Jackson, Honest Graft: Big Money and the American Political Process 9-10, 
98-99 (cited in note 88); Sabato, The Party's lust Begun: Shaping Political Parties for 
America's Future at 77 (cited in note 77); Herrnson, Party Campaigning in the 1980s at 35-
36 (cited in note 77). 
93. See, e.g., Kirk J. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign Finance Laws: Dilem-
mas, Concerns, and Opportunities, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 53 (1987); Clarisa Long, Shouting 
Down the Voice of the People: Political Parties, Powerful PACs, and Concerns About Cor-
ruption, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1994). 
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interests pursuing their agendas, and securing quid pro quos, 
through donations to the parties.94 
Conduit corruption is at heart an issue with a strong empiri-
cal component, but Justice Thomas's opinion reflects more 
armchair political science theorizing than any familiarity with 
campaign finance data. On the other hand, Justice Stevens' opin-
ion does little more than state that the possibility of conduit cor-
ruption is enough to justify the FECA limits. If, as the Buckley 
doctrine provides, party contributions are a form of constitution-
ally protected speech, then there ought to be at least some assess-
ment of the seriousness of the corruption danger as a part of the 
determination whether constitutionally protected speech may be 
curtailed. Even deference to Congress is not the same as 
abdication. 
The conduit corruption issue nicely displays the importance 
of questions about deference and empirical justification when 
courts consider the constitutionality of campaign finance limits. 
The gap between Justice Thomas and Justice Stevens demon-
strates anew how the Court has been unable to resolve this cen-
tral question. Unfortunately, the Court's difficulties seem to stem 
not from reasonable disagreements about how to assess disputed 
evidence but from an apparent unwillingness to deal seriously 
with empirical evidence and legislative justifications at all. As the 
Thomas and Stevens opinions reveal, the Court's two principal 
approaches have been either to disregard empirical evidence or 
not to require any. Surely, there is a middle position between 
complete dismissal of Congress' judgment9s and evidence that 
might support its action, and failure even to require that evi-
dence be presented and defended. 
(2) Party Influence Corruption: Justice Thomas's denial that 
party influence per se can be corrupting would appear to have a 
more substantial foundation than his summary rejection of con-
duit corruption. Party committee spending on behalf of candi-
dates is far more likely to be an instance of money used to 
advance shared candidate-donor interests in order to persuade 
94. Brooks Jackson contended that Rep. Tony Coelho's efforts to strengthen Con· 
gressional Democrats' finances in the 1980s "actually encouraged House Democrats to 
become more reliant on special interest money. The [Democratic Congressional) cam-
paign committee gets its own funds increasingly from lobbyists, PACs. and businessmen 
.... " Jackson, Honest Graft: Big Money and the American Political Process at 296 (cited 
in note 88). 
95. According to Justice Thomas, "[t)here is good reason to think that campaign 
reform is an especially inappropriate area for judicial deference to legislative judgment." 
116 S. Ct. at 2330 n.9. 
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voters than of money to influence a candidate to adopt or change 
a position. 
Nevertheless, candidate and party committee interests can 
diverge. In those circumstances, Justice Stevens may well be cor-
rect in asserting that "by virtue of its power to spend" the party 
may be able to exert "influence ... over the candidate. "96 The 
Progressive Era laws that shifted control over nominations from 
party committees and conventions to primaries constituted an ef-
fort to reduce the influence of party organizations over party 
candidates, presumably reflecting the notion that candidates (and 
elected officials) would embrace different positions on issues of 
public importance if they were less beholden to party officials.97 
Moreover, there is also evidence that contemporary party com-
mittees may attempt to leverage their control over coordinated 
spending to influence candidates-for example, to "persuade" 
candidates to hire the committees' preferred consultants or ac-
cept the committees' strategic advice with respect to their 
campaigns.9s 
Still, the preeminent goal of party committees is the election 
of party candidates, rather than influencing the issue positions of 
elected officials. Party committees will back only their own 
party's candidates, whereas many other political committees, par-
ticularly non-ideological political committees, will often offer 
some support to both major party candidates in a race, as a 
means of ensuring an opportunity to influence whoever wins the 
election. 
Moreover, even if Justice Stevens is right that unlimited co-
ordinated spending would provide the opportunity for greater 
party influence over candidates, influence is not the same as cor-
ruption. The real question is whether such party influence would 
be "improper" or "undue." As the cases from Buckley to Austin 
demonstrate, the Court has never determined what makes influ-
ence undue, other than to indicate that large sums of money 
given to a candidate or spent in coordination with the candidate 
can be a source of improper influence. But the distinction be-
tween money given to influence a candidate and money given to 
96. 116 S. Ct. at 2332. 
97. See, e.g., Jo Freeman, Political Party Contributions and Expenditures Under the 
Federal Election Campaign Act: Anomalies and Unfinished Business, 4 Pace L. Rev. 267, 
290 (1984) ("Historically, there certainly has been a belief that parties were capable of 
corruption. Most of the state laws regulating partHis passed at the tum of the century 
were intended to eliminate perceived corruption."). 
98. See Hermson, Party Campaigning in the 1980s at 57, 59 (cited in note 77). 
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help a candidate who is receptive to the donor's views or is other-
wise politically aligned with the donor is often elusive. 
Underlying Justice Thomas's concurrence is the assumption 
that a party cannot "unduly" influence its candidates. Apparently 
the more influence a party has over its candidates the better. 
That is also the position embraced by the party-responsibility 
school. The more influence a party committee has over its candi-
dates, presumably, the greater cohesion there will be among the 
party's officeholders, the more the party label will mean some-
thing in government and to the electorate, and the more the vot-
ers can look to party as a means of establishing government 
accountability. There is considerable scholarly support for a 
party-centered campaign finance system as a step toward creat-
ing a more "responsible" two-party system, with attendant bene-
fits for government performance and responsiveness.99 
But despite Justice Thomas's reference to "representative 
government in a party system," the United States has a long tra-
dition of candidate-centered elections coexisting with its party 
system.Ioo Parties are nowhere mentioned in the constitution. For 
most of this century, party committees have not controlled party 
nominations. Candidates have historically organized, conducted, 
and financed their own campaigns. Candidates' campaigns often 
emphasize a candidate's independence from party offices and 
even from other elected officials of their own party. The limit on 
party coordinated spending grows out of and is consistent with 
this tradition. 
In essence, the question of whether party committee coordi-
nated spending raises a danger of parties corrupting candidates is 
really a question of how much or how little potential for influ-
ence parties ought to be allowed to have over their candidates' 
campaigns-and whether Congress or the Court should decide 
this. Certainly, elected officials seem to be in a much better posi-
tion to consider and combine the multiple and often conflicting 
values of candidate autonomy, party responsibility, voter partici-
pation, and the potential for parties to serve as conduits for spe-
cial interest influence. Elected officials are more likely to 
understand the impact of the campaign finance laws on the polit-
99. See, e.g., Sabato, The Party's Just Begun: Shaping Political Parties for America's 
Future at 185-88, 212-23 (cited in note 77). 
100. See, e.g., Leon Epstein, Political Parties in the American Mold 5 (U. of Wisconsin 
Press, 1986) (American "political culture" is one "in which voters choose individuals, not 
merely parties, to represent them in executive and legislative offices"). 
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ical process and the interaction of party spending with other cam-
paign finance laws and governance generally.1o1 
Certainly there is no reason to believe that elected officials 
are likely to be hostile to party interests. Some independent com-
mittees may be composed of political outsiders, but party com-
mittees are the ultimate political insiders. The vast majority of 
elected federal and state officials are elected on party lines and 
nearly all carry major party labels. All of the members of the 
extremely important national party congressional campaign fi-
nance committees are members of Congress,102 and Congress has 
deliberated various bills that would expand the parties' role. As 
Republican party committees have generally outpaced their 
Democratic counterparts in raising money,w3 Republicans in 
Congress have tended to make lifting the limits on donations to 
parties and spending by parties a component of their campaign 
finance legislative agenda.Io4 
Party committees have not done badly under FECA. The 
Act allows individuals to give national party committees $20,000 
in a calendar year, and it allows political committees to give na-
tional party committees $15,000 per year, whereas the limits on 
individual and committee donations to candidates are $1,000, and 
$5,000, respectively, per candidate per election.ws The soft 
money exemption added in 1979 has enabled the parties to raise 
tens of millions of dollars for party-building activities.106 Most 
101. This includes the balance of political forces between the parties. Given the 
Republicans' traditionally greater success in raising funds, any change in the rules gov-
erning the party role has partisan implications as well. From a partisan perspective, Colo-
rado Republican is a victory for Republicans in general, as well as for the Colorado 
Republican Party. Of course, had either of the concurring opinions won the approval of a 
majority of the Court, the Republicans' victory would have been even more substantial. 
102. Hermson, Party Campaigning in the 1980s at 40 (cited in note 77); David B. 
Magleby and Candice J. Nelson, The Money Chase: Congressional Campaign Finance Re-
form 100-01 (Brookings Institution, 1990). 
103. See, e.g., John H. Aldrich, Why Panies? The Origin and Transformation of Polit-
ical Panies in America 256-58 (U. of Chicago Press, 1995); Epstein, Political Parties in the 
American Mold 216-23 (cited in note 100); Magleby and Nelson, The Money Chase: Con-
gressional Campaign Finance Reform at 102-12 (cited in note 102); Sabato, The Party's 
Just Begun: Shaping Political Parties for America's Future at 75-81 (cited in note 77). 
104. See, e.g., Herbert E. Alexander and Monica Bauer, Financing the 1988 Election 
117-18 (Westview Press, 1991) (discussing Republican campaign finance reform propos-
als); see also id. at 136 (noting partisan effects of Democratic proposals to tighten up on 
soft money). 
105. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1994). 
106. See, e.g., Alexander and Corrado, Financing the 1992 Election at 158 (cited in 
note 87) (noting that "both parties appear to be increasingly incorporating soft money 
into their overall financial schemes"). Early estimates indicate that the Democratic and 
Republican party committees each raised about $100 million in soft money in the 1995-96 
election cycle. See Peter H. Stone, The Green Wave, 28 Nat'! J. 2410 (Nov. 9, 1996). 
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scholars of the political parties have determined that the national 
parties have enjoyed greater influence with respect to the fi-
nances of their candidates' congressional campaigns since 
FECA's enactment than at any other time in their history.1o1 
Given the existence of campaign finance laws that limit both 
donations to candidates and the financial activities of non-party 
political committees, the concurring Justices' determination that 
parties have an unlimited right to engage in coordinated spend-
ing could, if embraced by a Court majority, provide an impetus 
for a more party-centered campaign finance system. This might, 
as party-responsibility advocates contend, promote party cohe-
sion and government accountability. A party-centered system 
might very well be a good idea. But it would be a major depar-
ture from past and present practice. And it is hard to believe that 
the decision whether to have a party-centered or candidate-cen-
tered system is a question of constitutional law, to be decided by 
the Supreme Court, rather than a preeminently political question 
to be decided by Congress. 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF A RIGHT OF UNLIMITED 
PARTY COORDINATED SPENDING FOR THE 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 
Colorado Republican came within one vote of eliminating 
limits on party spending in connection with congressional cam-
paigns. The plurality's focus on the asserted independence-in-fact 
of the anti-Wirth ad campaign is unlikely to provide a stable res-
olution of the question of party spending, and the question of the 
constitutionality of limits on party spending is likely to recur. 
Moreover, that question has broad implications for the overall 
structure of campaign finance regulation as well as for proposed 
reforms. 
Striking the limits on party spending may be like pulling on 
a loose thread and causing a whole sleeve to unravel. Justice 
Thomas's presumption that parties are incapable of corrupting 
their candidates would appear to eliminate the basis for restric-
tions on party contributions to candidates. Justice Kennedy's 
opinion sought to leave open the constitutionality of restrictions 
on "undifferentiated political party contributions,"ws but his no-
tion of the "practical identity" of party and candidate implicitly 
invalidates restrictions on party contributions to candidates, 
107. See, e.g., Epstein, Political Parties in the American Mold at 217-18 (cited in note 
100). 
108. 116 S. Ct. at 2323. 
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too-assuming parties would still want to make contributions if 
they enjoyed the right of unlimited coordinated expenditure. 
Thus, under either approach, invalidating the limit on coordi-
nated spending is likely to result in the elimination on any limits 
on party financial support for candidates. 
Further, Justice Thomas's opinion suggests the basis for an 
attack on the limits on contributions to parties. In cases dealing 
with contributions to political committees, the Court has given 
great weight to the corruptive potential of contributions by an 
organization in order to justify restrictions on contributions to 
the organization. Thus, Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of 
Berkeley109 invalidated an ordinance restricting contributions to 
committees that support or oppose ballot measures, reasoning 
that since spending by a ballot measure committee raises no pos-
sibility of corruption (since there was no candidate to corrupt) 
there was no constitutional basis for limiting contributions to the 
committee. But in California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, and FEC v. 
National Right to Work Committee the Court relied on the anti-
corruption rationale to uphold limits on contributions to PACs 
that gave funds to candidates.no 
Given Justice Thomas's reliance on the statutory limits on 
contributions to parties to rebut the argument that party expend-
itures raise the risk of conduit corruption, my argument that the 
logic of Thomas's position would undermine the limits on dona-
tions to parties may be something of a speculative stretch. Never-
theless, if the Court were to buy the argument that there is 
nothing corrupting in a party's influence over its candidates and 
that party size and diversity mitigate the danger of conduit cor-
ruption, then the anti-corruption rationale for limiting contribu-
tions to parties would be discredited. Although the growth of soft 
money has eroded the effect of FECA's limits on donations to 
parties, acceptance of Justice Thomas's argument might make it 
impossible to close the soft money loophole, and would also, of 
course, have implications for state laws that impose limits on con-
tributions to state parties in connection with state campaigns. 
A right of unlimited party spending could also knock out the 
spending limits in the presidential public funding system, and, 
similarly, jeopardize state public funding laws for state elections 
and proposals to use public funds to limit the use of private 
funds. Buckley invalidated limits on campaign expenditures but 
held that Congress could condition the grant of public funds on a 
109. 454 u.s. 290, 297 (1981). 
110. See CalMed, 453 U.S. at 197-99, 201; NRWC, 459 U.S. at 207-10. 
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candidate's acceptance of spending limits.m The limit on pub-
licly-funded candidate spending has also applied to spending by 
the candidate's party. The rise of soft money has dramatically 
expanded the amount of private funds available to publicly-
funded presidential candidates. Nevertheless, the statutory re-
strictions on party spending in support of presidential candidates 
make presidential elections primarily publicly funded and assure 
a measure of parity between the major party candidates. 
Could those restrictions survive a holding that party expend-
itures are constitutionally protected? If, as Justice Kennedy con-
tends, "candidates are necessary to make the party's message 
known and effective" and limits on party spending "constrain[ ] 
the party in advocating its most essential positions and pursuing 
its most basic goals,"uz then how can party spending on behalf of 
its leading speaker-its presidential candidate-be limited?ll3 
Under Buckley a presidential candidate can waive his or her own 
right to unlimited spending in order to receive party funds, but 
would a candidate's waiver bind party committees? 
In NCPAC, the Court held that a candidate's acceptance of 
spending limits as a condition for public funding did not bind in-
dependent committees, which remain entitled to spend unlimited 
sums in support of that candidate. Notwithstanding Justice Ken-
nedy's rhetoric about the "practical identity" of candidates and 
parties, presidential candidates do not control their party com-
mittees-certainly not the state committees or the congressional 
finance committees which might want to spend in support of the 
presidential candidate in order to have an effect on the fortunes 
of party candidates further down the ballot. If, as Justice Ken-
nedy put it, parties "exist to advance their members' shared 
political beliefs,"114 it may not be possible for one candidate to 
waive the speech rights of the many people affiliated with the 
party. 
A right of unlimited party coordinated spending thus might 
make it impossible to limit candidate spending even as a condi-
tion for the receipt of public funds. It is possible that only parties 
could waive party spending rights. This might mean that any at-
111. 424 U.S. at 57 n.65. See also Republican Nat'/ Comm v. Federal Election Com-
mission, 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd 445 U.S. 955 (1980). 
112. 116 S. Ct. at 2322-23. 
113. Indeed, even the plurality threatens public funding since party committees, such 
as state party committees, that avoid direct contact with the presidential candidates could 
be "independent-in-fact" and presumably could engage in unlimited spending on behalf 
of the party's presidential candidate. Under the concurrences, party committees might be 
able to work with their presidential candidate directly. 
114. Id. at 2322. 
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tempt to use the public funding system to enforce spending limits 
might require offering public funding to the parties rather than 
(or in addition to) the candidates. This would certainly serve to 
promote greater party responsibility in government, and might 
even be a good idea, but it would be a sharp departure from ex-
isting practice if public funding of parties were to become neces-
sary to impose spending limits on candidates.11s 
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF COLORADO REPUBLICAN 
FOR BUCKLEYv. VALEO 
Colorado Republican was a hard case, as the multiple opin-
ions suggest. The Court's difficulty may have been attributable in 
part to the constitutionally ambiguous status of parties. In other 
cases, the Court has treated parties both as quasi-state actors, 
subject to constitutional requirements, and as the epitome of the 
private political associations shielded by the First Amendment 
from state regulation. Indeed, earlier this past term, the Court 
fragmented along lines similar to those in Colorado Republican 
when it considered whether the Voting Rights Act could be ap-
plied to a change in a state party's convention rules.II6 
Moreover, party spending poses a particularly hard issue for 
the Buckley framework. Buckley's contribution/expenditure dis-
tinction and its concern with corruption implicitly assume a sepa-
ration between candidates and their financial backers, and the 
possibility that financial support will be a source of improper in-
fluence on candidates. But parties are composed of both candi-
dates and contributors to their campaigns. Party committees 
support candidates primarily to advance their shared interests 
rather than to influence them. Parties thus straddle the candi-
date-contributor gap intrinsic to the Buckley model. 
115. It is possible that in the existing presidential public funding system, the provision 
of public funds for the national party conventions could provide the basis for the party 
waiver of the right of unlimited coordinated spending. However, if the parties were able 
to raise and spend unlimited amounts of money in the presidential election they might 
choose to forgo public funds for the convention. Despite the public funding law, large 
donors currently play a significant role in financing the party conventions. See Phil Kuntz 
and Michael K. Frisby, For Big Contributors, Convention's Business Isn't at the Podium, 
Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1996 at Al. 
Nor, given the traditionally decentralized structure of the major parties, is it clear 
that the party national committee's agreement to limit spending in exchange for conven-
tion funds would bind state party committees. 
116. See Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996). As in Colo-
rado Republican, the principal groupings on the Court were Justices Stevens and Gins-
burg in an opinion by Justice Stevens; Justices Breyer, O'Connor and Souter in an opinion 
by Justice Breyer; and Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist 
in multiple overlapping opinions. 
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Colorado Republican may also be indicative of deeper diffi-
culties in the Court's approach to campaign finance regulation. 
Buckley assumes a distinction between expressions of support for 
political ideas and positions and efforts to influence candidates-
the former are treated as constitutionally protected from restric-
tion while the latter are treated as problematic and subject to 
regulation. Yet the distinction between support for ideas and ef-
forts to influence candidates is often elusive. Money given to sup-
port a candidate who shares the donor's beliefs or issue-positions 
may influence the candidate to continue to adhere to that posi-
tion, while money given to influence a candidate usually goes to 
candidates who have signaled at least some openness to support-
ing the donor's position. 
Moreover, Buckley is focused entirely on the question of the 
influence of campaign money on candidates and officeholders; 
the Court firmly ruled out consideration of the influence of cam-
paign money or of disparities in resources available for political 
activity on the conduct or outcomes of elections as a factor in 
constitutional analysis. Concerns about the influence of money, 
and especially of unequal sums of money, on election outcomes 
has been a prime factor driving campaign finance regulation. 
Even the Court, Buckley notwithstanding, has not been entirely 
immune to these concerns, as Austin's focus on corporate cam-
paign war chests demonstrates-although Austin wrapped its 
concern over unequal spending in the open-ended language of 
corruption. 
Dissatisfaction with Buckley led one Colorado Republican 
Justice explicitly and two others implicitly to break away from 
the Buckley framework. Justice Thomas, in the portion of his 
opinion not joined by any other Justice, rejected the contribu-
tion/expenditure distinction, and urged that restrictions on con-
tributions, as well as limitations on expenditures, be subject to 
strict scrutiny. In his view, bribery laws and disclosure require-
ments are adequate to prevent corruption.u7 Conversely, one of 
the reasons Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, gave for 
sustaining the FECA limits is the government's "important inter-
est in leveling the electoral playing field by constraining the cost 
of federal campaigns."us This is flatly inconsistent with Buckley's 
rejection of any government interest in limiting the cost of cam-
117. 116 S. Ct. at 2325-29. 
118. Id. at 2332. 
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paigns as a justification for limiting campaign finances.n9 More-
over, the dissent's citation to Justice White's Buckley dissent, its 
skepticism that increased campaign spending necessarily pro-
motes the "informed debate protected by the First Amendment," 
and its willingness to "accord special deference" to Congress's 
"wisdom and experience" concerning campaign finance suggest 
that Justices Stevens and Ginsburg may have rejected the Buck-
ley doctrine generally. 
Colorado Republican's difficulties in applying the Buckley 
framework and the rejection of the Buckley approach by three 
members of the Court indicate the troubled state of the current 
doctrinal approach to campaign finance regulation. Nonetheless, 
it may be a little premature to toll Buckley's death knell. Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice White dissented from basic elements 
of Buckley twenty years ago and Justice Marshall subsequently 
came to reject the contribution/expenditure distinction12o so the 
doctrine has survived the opposition of three sitting Justices 
before. 
Moreover, given the different directions in which the 
Thomas and Stevens opinions pull, the Court seems far from a 
consensus on a model that would replace Buckley. Austin hinted 
at a greater acceptance of egalitarian arguments for campaign 
limits, but with the replacement of Austin's author, Justice Mar-
shall, by Justice Thomas, Austin itself may be hanging by a thread 
and may be more of a special "corporations" case now than ever 
before.m At the same time, no other member of the Colorado 
Republican Court endorsed Justice Thomas's extreme hostility to 
campaign finance regulation. The plurality's fact-specific decision 
may indicate a concern by those three Justices to minimize judi-
cial disruption of Congress' campaign finance handiwork. Judi-
cially mandated deregulation of campaign finance seems even 
119. Indeed, one of the reasons the plurality rejected the danger of corruption as a 
basis for restricting party independent spending is its determination that Congress 
adopted the FECA ceiling not to control corruption "but rather for the constitutionally 
insufficient purpose of reducing what it saw as wasteful and excessive campaign spend-
ing." ld. at 2317. 
120. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 518. 
121. Austin was decided by a vote of 6-3. The six Justices in the majority were Justice 
Marshall, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun and Stevens. 
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Scalia dissented. The replacement of Justice Marshall by 
Justice Thomas reduces support for Austin's broad reading of corruption from six to five. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist has consistently supported the Buckley framework, but has 
equally consistently made a special exception to permit restrictions on corporations. 
There is no evidence that any of the Austin dissenters have become more receptive to 
arguments that governments may justify spending restrictions to limit the impact of cam-
paign war chests on the electorate. 
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less probable than judicial endorsement of egalitarian 
restrictions. 
For all its problems, then, Buckley continues to shape judi-
cial consideration of campaign finance regulation. Buckley's in-
ternal tensions will make the doctrine difficult to apply and the 
evolution of case law difficult to predict. Campaign finance cases 
are likely to remain an arena of conflict within the Court, much 
as Buckley's limited focus on quid pro quo corruption will con-
tinue to be a source of conflict between the Court and campaign 
finance reformers. 
